

NPS ARCHIVE
1968
BIGLEY, T.

Thomas Josphe Bigley

AN INQUIRY INTO THE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS AND ITS ROLE IN NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY FORMULATION.

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AN INQUIRY INTO THE OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
AND ITS
ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FORMULATION

by

Thomas Joseph Bigley

//

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

International Relations

Signature of Committee:

Chairman _____

Dean of the School

Date: _____

1968

The American University
Washington, D. C.

NPS ARCHIVE ~~thesis~~ B5405

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Located in the Department of Defense is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA). It is often described as the "Pentagon's State Department".

ISA had its beginnings in 1949 as the inter-departmental point of contact within the Department of Defense on matters of military assistance. From this form of a simple military assistance institution it has evolved into a politico-military bureau. This has occurred primarily because the role of the Defense Establishment in the area of international security affairs has grown with the realization that defense policies involve not merely matters of strategy but also involve relations with allies and international organizations, and are influenced by the availability of resources. All of these require close coordination with the Department of State and other agencies of government. This is the basic concern of the Office of ISA, which today has administration responsibility for military aid and sales, for liaison with the Department of State, for following up National Security Council decisions, and for arranging Defense participation in international conferences.

Of all the units under the Secretary of Defense, the Office of ISA is the one most directly related to the overall organization for national security. As the focal point for Department of Defense positions on national security matters it has been articulate and, as a result, has exerted considerable and positive influence in the formulation of national security policy.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Located in the Department of Defense is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA). It is often described as the "Pentagon's State Department".

ISA had its beginnings in 1949 as the inter-departmental point of contact within the Department of Defense on matters of foreign military assistance. In 1949 inter-departmental contacts and coordination, although not a new concept in government, were still rare and did not have a long history, especially as they related to the Departments of State and Defense. In fact, the very first institutionalized link between the civilian and the military policy making powers did not occur until 1938, and was brought about as a result of Fascist and National Socialist activities in Latin America. A Standing Liaison Committee composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations was established by President Roosevelt in April of that year to coordinate certain types of assistance for the defense of the Panama Canal and the protection of Latin America against the Axis threat.¹ Although some coordination did exist during World War II, it was neither close nor significant and was completely inadequate

¹Urs Schwarz, American Strategy: A New Perspective, (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 25-26.

for dealing with the complex involvements which obtained in the post World War II period. But, it was not until the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 that legislation provided for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.²

In July 1959, the U. S. Senate established the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations to study how well our Government was organized to develop, coordinate, and execute foreign and defense policy. It was the finding of this Subcommittee that the most important problems of national security are joint State-Defense problems, requiring joint action by the two departments for their solution.³ These problems range from the development and execution of military aid programs, the negotiation of base rights, and arms control planning, through the overriding problems of properly relating military means with foreign policy ends.

The Senate Subcommittee also recognized that cooperation between State and Defense had not always been close primarily because Defense lacked confidence in State's handling of military matters and felt it could not get precise enough long term political guidance. State, on

²National Security Act of 1947, As Amended, Sec. 2, Public Law 216, 81st Congress, August 10, 1949.

³U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Organizing For National Security: Staff Reports and Recommendations, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Volume 3, p. 49.

the other hand, deplored the Pentagon's inability to speak with one voice on strategic doctrine.⁴

Despite the deep-seated differences of tradition and outlook which had stood between the Pentagon and the State Department, a full and sympathetic partnership between State and Defense was, in the view of the Subcommittee, critical to achieving our national security goals.⁵

Thus, from a simple military assistance institution established for the purpose of coordination, ISA has evolved into a politico-military bureau. In addition to fulfilling a need for coordination, this growth has occurred primarily because the role of the Defense Establishment in the area of international security affairs has grown with the realization that defense policies involve not merely matters of strategy but also involve relations with allies and international organizations, and are influenced by the availability of resources. These are the basic concerns of the Office of ISA, which today has administrative responsibility for military aid and military sales, for liaison with the Department of State, for following up National Security Council decisions, and for arranging Defense participation in international conferences.

The Charter for ISA designates the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

functional field of international security. As such he is authorized to coordinate not only with State, but with the Military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Department of Defense agencies having collateral or related functions in this field, and to make full use of the established facilities within the Defense Establishment.

This authorization to maintain close relationships with other agencies allows ISA, in search of answers and solutions to current problems, to be both responsive and prompt in furnishing the Secretary of Defense with the necessary information and analysis to support him in his capacity as a statutory member of the National Security Council.

Of all the units under the Secretary of Defense, the Office of ISA is the one most directly related to the overall organization for national security. As the focal point for Department of Defense positions on national security matters it has been dynamic and articulate, and, as a result, has exerted considerable and positive influence in the formulation of national security policy.

This inquiry will focus on the origins and evolution of ISA, and will examine in some detail the complex and varied undertakings which involve this Office in the Defense Department's policy making process.

In pursuing this inquiry the candidate has relied mainly on existing and superseded Department of Defense documents and interviews over a three year period with personnel who have worked or who are now working in the Office of International Security Affairs.

CHAPTER II

ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ISA

I. 1947-1949

Before the Korean War the Office of the Secretary of Defense was relatively small. In addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board, there was only the War Council, now called the Armed Forces Policy Council.⁶ Even the staff of the Secretary of Defense was small and included only three special assistants who were primarily engaged with fiscal, budget, and military aid matters and who worked with the Armed Services in coordinating the Defense Department's responsibilities in these fields. During this period, the War Council advised the Secretary of Defense on both civilian and military matters. In 1949 it was made the major intra-departmental body to consider problems before they were submitted to the National Security Council (NSC). But the War Council proved ineffective as a policy formulating instrument for politico-military affairs, partly because it overlapped the role assigned by the National Security Act of 1947 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisors to the President and the National Security Council. In addition, the then existing State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC),

⁶

It was redesigned by the National Security Act Amendment of 1949 and combined the memberships of the Joint Secretaries (minus the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) with that of the JCS.

which was in effect a clearing house for information, tended to short circuit the War Council's work. This Committee was finally abolished in late 1949.

II. 1949-1952

After the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the Secretary of Defense established an Office of Military Assistance (OMA) to work with State and the Economic Cooperation Administration in administering the military aid program, and the Chief of Staff Army was designated by the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for Mutual Defense Assistance.⁷ As such it fell to the Army to coordinate the interests and activities of the three military departments.

The Korean War and the defense build-up which followed brought about a broad expansion of the international security affairs' area. U. S. military aid was substantially increased, NATO was strengthened, plans were made to rearm Germany, and a Japanese peace treaty was signed. But the embryo International Security Affairs organization, which then consisted of the Armed Forces Policy Council and the Office of Military Assistance (OMA) still proved inadequate in handling all of the politico-military problems that arose. Some, such as the strategy re-evaluation contained in one of the basic National Security Council policy papers,

⁷Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 46.

and the instructions to the United States' delegate at the Panmunjom armistice negotiations, were apparently handled by special ad hoc groups composed of State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives. On others, a representative of International Security Affairs was included, as with the proposal to rearm Germany. According to one participant in the State-JCS-ISA conference on the subject, the National Security Council never formally discussed this decision, although it was cleared with each member individually.⁸

On December 19, 1950, President Truman established the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The responsibility of this office and the staff associated with it were steadily increased so that by 1952, these responsibilities included the development of Department of Defense views and positions and the coordination of all activities within the Department of Defense relating to international security affairs, including mutual defense assistance programs, North Atlantic Treaty affairs, United Nations affairs, National Security Council actions, psychological policy affairs, inter-governmental conferences and other politico-military matters, and for arranging for the representation of the Department of Defense on inter-agency and international organizations related to international security affairs. To meet these responsibilities the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

⁸Ibid.

for International Security Affairs was organized to provide for four Deputy Assistants; one to act as the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; and one each for National Security Council affairs, European Mutual Security affairs, and Psychological affairs. In addition, offices for Military Assistance, Foreign Military affairs, North Atlantic Treaty affairs, and Foreign Economic Defense affairs were established. (See Figure 1, page 9.)

Under the guidance of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the Secretary was able to speak authoritatively for the Department on International Security Affairs in dealing with other government agencies. The Deputies and other offices were assigned the following duties:

Deputy for National Security Council Affairs--served as a Deputy Representative to the Senior Staff of the National Security Council (NSC).

Deputy for European Mutual Security Affairs--served as the focal point for and coordinated matters transacted between the Department of Defense and the U. S. Special Representative in Europe.

Deputy for Psychological Policy Affairs--advised on matters relating to the Psychological Strategy Board in furtherance of the national psychological effort, and advised on broad intelligence matters other than those relating to domestic security for which the Secretary of Defense had policy responsibility as a member of the National Security Council.

Office of Military Assistance--was responsible for insuring the development and implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Programs




FIGURE 1

OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

1952

pursuant to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and for coordinating matters affecting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with the Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs.

This Office acted as the point of contact and coordination for all matters concerning the military end item and training programs for military assistance and as the focal point for the Secretary of Defense in dealing in those matters with the U. S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe, other government agencies, the JCS, Munitions Board, the three services and the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG). General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, now Supreme Allied Commander in Europe was appointed the first director of this office.

Office of Foreign Military Affairs--this office was charged with developing and establishing Department of Defense policies and programs in the politico-military field and similar to the Office of Military Assistance, was also responsible for coordinating matters affecting the NATO with the Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs. This office also maintained a world wide analysis and review of the politico-military situation and recommended courses of action to the Secretary of Defense, through the Special Assistant Secretary/ISA, required to correct current and anticipated problems. It was this office that coordinated the Department of Defense position on all matters in the politico-military field and became the focal point of the Department of Defense dealings in these matters with the Department of State and other agencies external to Defense. Politico-military aspects of U. S. military bases on

foreign territory and juridicial status of U. S. forces abroad also fell under the cognizance of this very important office. General responsibility for the development of Department of Defense views in connection with the preparation of U. S. governmental positions on United Nations matters also fell under the purview of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs.

Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs--this office acted as the point of contact within ISA for all matters concerning Department of Defense interest in the NATO and became the focal point of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in these matters with the JCS, the joint secretaries, and other agencies designated as executive agencies for joint service action within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was this office that was charged with insuring the availability of timely strategic advice and recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to NATO and for the formulation of plans, policies and courses of action for the implementation of approved programs in support of established U. S. foreign policy having a bearing on NATO.

Office of Foreign Economic Defense Affairs--the developing and establishing of Department of Defense policies and programs concerning the defense interest in the foreign economic affairs of the U. S. Government, fell to this office. These responsibilities included the developing of coordinated DOD positions on the economic and the technical assistance provisions of mutual security legislation and implementing orders and agreements, covering matters such as strategic materials; technical cooperation (Point IV program); assistance to production; and tariff duties. This office was also charged with formulating the Defense

Department position on U. S. policies and programs relative to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program and for developing policies for DOD intergovernmental economic mobilization planning and for coordinating the development and monitoring the progress of supporting programs by the Munitions Board.

Meanwhile in 1950, a memorandum of agreement between the Secretaries of Defense, State, Treasury, and the Director, Economic Cooperation Administration, and approved by the President, had established the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC).⁹ The Office of the Director of International Security Affairs, although in the State Department, was almost "supra-departmental" since the Director, in his capacity as Chairman of ISAC, exercised responsibility for the government as a whole. ISAC thus became the formal mechanism for the interdepartmental coordination of foreign aid programs and its Director was also the State Department's Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The Defense Department's focal point for coordinating foreign aid now became the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs who was to provide a Defense Department viewpoint for ISAC, as well as for the NSC.¹⁰

There was a most complex relationship during 1951 and 1952 among the various departments involving the Director for Mutual Security, who

⁹The Economic Cooperation Administration was disbanded in 1961 and replaced by the Agency for International Development (AID).

¹⁰Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 253.

at the time was Mr. Averell Harriman, and the additional and quite unique office of the President's Special Representative in Europe. The Special Representative (initially Mr. William H. Draper) was to act for the President as the senior U. S. civilian representative and to speak for the government as a whole. In effect, he possessed a merger of the authorities of the Secretaries of Defense, State, Treasury, and the Director for Mutual Security.¹¹ The Defense Department's focal point for coordinating aid in this channel was also the Assistant to the Secretary for International Security Affairs. Defense was usually represented by someone from the ISA staff on the various inter-departmental groups such as the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee, and the Economic Defense Advisory Committee as well as the International Security Affairs Committee, which existed at that time.¹²

The complicated accounting and budgetary arrangements involved in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program required the addition of a budget advisor and a statistical advisor to the Defense Department's International Security Affairs staff. They specialized in international programs but were responsible to the Defense Comptroller's office for much of their clerical and administrative support. This was the first step toward the creation of an independent ISA Comptroller which was to come later.

¹¹ Arthur MacMahon, Administration in Foreign Affairs, (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1953), p. 161.

¹² Stanley, op.cit., pp. 48-49.

III. 1953-1955

In February 1953, the Assistant for International Security Affairs was promoted to the rank of Assistant Secretary of Defense, and his office underwent still further changes. Later in 1953, Reorganization Plan No. 6 to the National Security Act of 1947 abolished the unwieldy structure of Boards and Committees within the Office of Secretary of Defense. The Munitions Board's Office of International Programs was transferred to ISA and incorporated within the Office of Foreign Economic Defense Policy which was now placed under a new Office of Foreign Economic Affairs. This latter office developed area branches which were assigned to work closely with the country officers at the State Department. The direct liaison that was thus encouraged in 1953 to insure that the Defense Department officials kept abreast of the current thinking and developments at State has worked exceptionally well in recent years.¹³

Other changes brought about in 1953 saw the creation of the Office of the Director of National Security Council Affairs which was really a strengthening within ISA of the embryonic office of the Deputy for NSC Affairs in order to improve coordination with the National Security Council. The Director was given greater responsibilities for a synthesis of Defense Department recommendations on matters to be

¹³ U. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Administration of National Security: Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 597-99. Both Secretary Ruck and Secretary McElmura in letters to the Subcommittee attested to the close coordination, cooperation and mutual understanding now being achieved between the two departments.

considered by the Council or on policies and actions of the Council. The Director also served as the Defense representative on the National Security Council Planning Board when this Board was in existence.¹⁴ These functions brought about a marked improvement in integrating the Defense Department into a larger national security structure.

An important change also in 1954 came about as the result of an agreement between the Assistant Secretary and the Defense Comptroller which resulted in the setting up of an independent ISA Comptroller. This was important because it was a departure from the usual organization, and is an arrangement still unique in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.¹⁵

Another innovation at this time was the International Security Plan which brought together by country various directives, policies, and programs concerned with mutual defense assistance. NSC guidance was so broad that different agencies interpreted policy in different ways. There also had been too little coordination between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department. The plan was designed to overcome jurisdictional disputes and insure coordination at the departmental level.

¹⁴Upon the disbandment of the Planning Board of NSC in 1961 these planning duties were absorbed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning (ISA), and in 1965 they were placed under the Policy Planning Staff of ISA. This staff is no longer headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary.

¹⁵The ISA Comptroller today is known as the Military Assistance Comptroller under the Office of the Director of Military Assistance in ISA.

IV. 1956-1960


By 1956 the evolution of the ISA organization had resulted in some name changes and consolidations. The following major units existed:

(1) The Office of National Security Council Affairs; (2) The Office of Foreign Military Affairs, (including a Plans Division, a Policy Division with area branches, a Foreign Economic Defense Division, and the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (U. S. and Canada); (3) A Comptroller; and (4) The Office of Military Assistance Programs.¹⁶ The last named was divided into a Control Division, which directly supervised the Military Aid Advisory Groups in Foreign Countries; the Operations Division which coordinated and processed military aid requirements requested by our allies and approved by the Joint Chiefs; and the Procurement and Production Division which was concerned with such matters as off-shore procurement.

As the scope and nature of the United States' commitments overseas changed, so did ISA's organization. The body not only kept pace with, but sometimes exceeded the rest of the Defense Department in being organized and reorganized. On January 1, 1956 a complete revision was made by the new Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Mr. Gordon Gray.

The functions already described for the various units of the organization were in large part reassigned within ISA by Mr. Gray's reorganization. These were substantially the recommendations made by

¹⁶ Stanley, op.cit., p. 49.



Cressap, McCormick and Padget, Management Consultants of Chicago, who made a survey of ISA at the request of Mr. Gray in the fall of 1955.

Uppermost among the findings of the Cresap, McCormick and Padget report, which had the encompassing title Survey of the Defense Representative, North Atlantic and Mediterranean Area--Defense Advisor, United States Regional Organization and Other Designated Organizations Closely Associated with the Operation of Mutual Defense Assistance Programs, was the fact that there existed no provision in the organization for adequate integration of individual country matters and insufficient coordination for control over the organization as a whole. The basic organizational sub-division of responsibility between military assistance and military affairs did not recognize the close relationship that exists between "Affairs" and "assistance".

The survey pointed out the then existing organizational arrangement overlooked certain fundamental requirements for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. First, it did not recognize the difference in organizational requirements for the various major elements of the program. Organizational requirements for the Mutual Weapons Development, according to Cresap, McCormick and Padget, were entirely different than those for the end item segment of the Program. Second, the existing arrangement provided intermediate coordinating or supervisory organizations which could not work effectively when all major decisions were made at the Washington level because of the requirements for coordination between State and Defense on the entire Mutual Assistance Program.

Mr. Gray's subsequent reorganization was designed to take more effective account of the fact that military assistance was becoming a primary tool for effecting many military as well as politico-economic decisions in the international field. Military assistance programming and planning was therefore integrated into offices handling foreign military affairs pertaining to individual countries. To carry out the arrangement necessary to effect the desired results, four geographic Regional Directorates were established to handle international problems not normally related to individual country matters; an office to direct, coordinate and control military assistance programs as such; and an office to combine with National Security Council affairs to provide, direct and initiate plans projected from two to five years ahead of approved assistance programs.

Another major addition was an office of Operations Coordinating Board Affairs which was more accurately a transfer from the Office of Special Operations. This Office was designed to perform for the then existing Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) what the Office of National Security Council Affairs did for the NSC. A complete separation of the International Security Affairs Comptroller from the Defense Department Comptroller was also finalized by the 1956 reorganization.

Another shortcoming in the organization pointed up by the Cresap, McCormick and Padget report was that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) did not have the benefit of direct reporting by the in-country Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on country program political

and economic implications. On the contrary, military assistance aspects were reported directly to State by its Country Team member. Responsibility for management supervision of the MAAG organization was thus diffused under that concept of organization. As a result of this criticism Regional Directors within ISA were delegated liaison functions with Military Assistance Advisory Groups. Their establishment as independent units was a parallel to the State Department organization.

The internal reorganization produced other changes which resulted in the Plans Division of the old Office of Foreign Military Affairs becoming the Office of Planning. Foreign Economic Defense responsibilities were transferred to the new Office of Special International Security Affairs which was charged with preparing Department of Defense policies on international conferences. Preparing for and arranging Defense representation at these conferences became one of ISA's more important tasks, since the large number of existing collective security pacts required that Defense participate equally with the State Department. United States' support of NATO military activities continued as in the past to be furnished by the military departments who acted as administrative agents for the various services. Internationally budgeted support was provided directly by the Secretary of Defense from military assistance appropriations. The Office of Military Aid Programs was abolished also at this time and its functions transferred to a new Office of Programming and Control, which today has been incorporated into the Office of the Director for Military Assistance.

While the changes brought about in the organization of ISA were extensive, they reflected the basic finding of the Cresap report that such rearrangements were necessary to assure the most efficient and thorough-going approach to the solution of international problems from the standpoint of the Department of Defense. Although deficiencies resulting from inadequate integration of affairs and assistance matters, duplication, overlapping, lack of coordination and the like may be cured by improvements in management, Mr. Gray cautioned that effective results do not automatically follow from reorganization per se. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in March 1956 concerning the reorganization of ISA, Mr. Gray stated that while the rearrangements within ISA were made in the interest of increasing the overall organizational effectiveness of ISA, a major factor in the success of any such reorganization is bound up in the human equation. Mr. Gray, therefore, commenced a second study of ISA which concerned itself with the problems of personnel. It was the finding of this second study that the existing staff complement of ISA was badly overworked. Payroll records indicated that for the fourteen-week period from 23 October 1955 to 28 January 1956 ISA reported a total of 5,162 hours overtime. Nearly two-thirds of this amount was reported for the then eighty secretarial and clerical employees. The approximate dollar value of this would have paid the salaries of ten additional secretaries. No statistics were maintained on the amount of overtime put in by the fifty-six military personnel in ISA, who as members of the professional staff contributed their share of labor to

that reflected in the work load carried by the secretarial staff. Because of the work load and overtime requirements, Mr. Gray reported that ISA offices were falling steadily behind in their normal performance, and the standards of work were no up to par and mistakes were being made. This situation existed in both the professional and secretarial groups. With the element of time compressed by ever mounting requirements, the number of problems inevitably increased, and Mr. Gray found that the result in the main tended to jeopardize operational efficiency, taxed physical endurance, affected morale and debased the final product. These problems were not new. They existed before reorganization. The reorganization had simply served to bring them more distinctly into the open. An example of the increase in the work load was reflected in the tremendous increase (500%) in the number of action cases resulting from cables coming into ISA within the previous four months. This load further served to point up the fact that policy making in the international field in 1956 had become a matter of extreme complexity. The Regional Directorates of ISA had to constantly cope with the large number of countries in their respective areas; the increasing Soviet efforts at penetration; the continual problems relating to the scope and nature of U. S. Allied commitments; and the absorbing issues which were being posed by the then called "uncommitted nations".

Mr. Gray foresaw the new and recently acquired authorities of ISA being counterproductive if additional staffing was not provided. In 1954 and 1955 Department of Defense Directives were promulgated which effectively increased the responsibility delegated for the formulation,

administration and control of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program to ISA. These delegations to ISA greatly increased the requirements for "knowhow" in every phase of the administration of this program. When the program originated, control was centered in the various Executive Agents. The Department of Defense sent only broad guidance to the Services and relied upon spot checks to effect control. In 1956 ISA directed the operation and consequently had to be fully prepared to back up its actions. This was not a product of Mr. Gray's reorganization. It was nevertheless intensified by it because the rearrangements increased the ability of ISA to program more accurately and to focus upon all aspects of Military Assistance from policy formulation through deliveries.

Without additional staffing Mr. Gray also foresaw the danger of the basic reasons for establishing the Regional Directorates being negated because time denied the professional personnel the opportunity to inform themselves properly as country experts. The process of simply keeping informed of the military, political and economic and psychological situation in a given area was essential if ISA were to perform properly. Under the working condition existing in early 1956 time for discerning thought simply did not exist. An essential aspect of the problem was the need for time to be spent away from Washington to make field trips to familiarize the professional staffer of ISA with the areas which were the basis of day to day activities in the office. Although it was necessary to make the effort, Mr. Gray advised his boss that ISA could ill afford to sacrifice the time of its principals and its staff

members at international conferences even when their presence fulfilled the need for official U. S. representation.

It was because of concerns such as this that Mr. Gray asked for and was authorized the addition of twenty-nine professional and twenty-four secretarial personnel.

The operation of the Office of International Security Affairs, more than most other organizations has varied widely under different officials. Each Assistant Secretary who has served in ISA since 1950 has changed something of its organization. The more important changes have been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. A further detailed analysis of each of these internal changes would not contribute significantly to any clearer picture of ISA's functions so I shall not burden the reader further in this regard. For the most part, the internal changes have been designed to improve the over-all contribution made by the Office and have tended to strengthen the working relationships with State and other Departments.

CHAPTER III

PRESENT ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS

Today, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs has a staff of 300 people including a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, who is the "Vice President" in the organization, six additional Deputy Assistant Secretaries, a Director of Military Assistance and 168 professional and project officers of which 67 are military officers from all branches of the Armed Forces.

The current charter for the Office of International Security Affairs designates the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the functional field of international security.¹⁷ Under the provisions of the charter the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is assigned the following functions in his assigned field of responsibility:

1. Monitor Department of Defense participation in National Security Council Affairs, including development, coordination and recommendation of the positions of and the provision of staff support for the Defense member on the Council.
2. Assist the Secretary of Defense, the several components of the Department of Defense and other agencies of the government in establishing defense policies by:

¹⁷ Department of Defense Directive, Number 5132.2 of May 20, 1961.

- a. Determining through continuous study of the world situation the current and emerging international problems of major significance to the security of the United States, and analyzing the range of possible politico-military actions for dealing with the long-term aspects of such problems;
 - b. Identifying the national security objectives of the United States and developing the international politico-military and foreign economic implications of currently approved, new or alternative programs of force structures, weapons systems and other military capabilities designed to attain these objectives; and
 - c. Presenting this information in such form as will help identify basic international security issues, alternative policies and appropriate criteria of choice.
3. Initiate appropriate actions and measures within the Department of Defense implementing approved National Security Council policies.
 4. Develop and coordinate Defense positions, policies, plans and procedures in the fields of international politico-military and foreign economic affairs, including arms control and disarmament, of interest to the Department of Defense with respect to negotiating and monitoring of agreements with foreign governments and international organizations on military facilities, operating

rights, status of forces and other international politico-military matters.

5. Provide policy guidance, as appropriate, to components of the Department of Defense, DOD representatives on United States Missions and to international organizations and conferences.

6. Develop, coordinate and establish Department of Defense positions, plans and procedures pertaining to the Military Assistance Program, and supervise, administer and direct the Military Assistance Program, and other activities of interest to the Department under the Mutual Security Program.

7. Plan, organize and monitor the activities of Military Assistance Advisory Groups, including joint United States military advisory groups and training missions insofar as they concern military assistance functions. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is assigned staff responsibility for direct communication with unified and specified commands on matters relating to the Military Assistance Program.¹⁸

In the performances of these functions, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is charged with:

1. Coordinate actions as appropriate with the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Department of Defense

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 2-3.

agencies having collateral or related functions in the field of his assigned responsibility.

2. Maintain active liaison for the exchange of information and advice with the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Department of Defense agencies.

3. Coordinate relations between the Department of Defense and the Department of State in the field of his assigned responsibility.

4. Make full use of established facilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Defense agencies.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and is vested with the necessary authority by the Secretary of Defense to perform his assigned functions.

The principal working divisions within ISA today to assist the Assistant Secretary in performing his functions are:¹⁹

1. Office of Policy Planning and Arms Control
2. Office of Africa and Western Hemisphere Affairs
3. Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
4. Office of European and NATO Affairs
5. Office of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
6. Office of Director of Military Assistance
7. Office of International Logistics Negotiations

¹⁹See Figure 2, p. 28.




FIGURE 2
OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

1967

Office of Policy Planning and Arms Control

The principal Division within this office is the Policy Planning Staff. The Planning Staff is organized with separate assistants for Economic Affairs, Strategic Planning, Counter-insurgency, Southeast Asian Affairs, Latin American and African Affairs. The Policy Planning Staff is often likened to the Policy Planning Council of the State Department, but in its actual functions it is more operational than a planning body. In addition to being the Department of Defense focal point for contributions to and clearance of National Policy Papers and contingency studies, the Policy Planning Staff is charged with current operational responsibilities in the following fields:

- a. Principal advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on politico-military matters in the USSR and Eastern European Communist countries (except Yugoslavia, which is under the European Directorate).
- b. Responsible for DOD input and support of continuing work of the Special Committee of the NATO Defense Ministers.
- c. Acts as the focal point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for development and coordination of DOD positions on matters under consideration by the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), including counter-insurgency policies and programs. Distribution of decisions made by the SIG and the monitoring of their implementation is also a responsibility of the Policy

Planning Staff.²⁰

- d. Prepares DOD positions and coordinates on other economic matters of interest to the DOD, including preparation of economic analyses and World-wide and Country Economic Data Sheets for inclusion in the annual Congressional Presentations Documents as required by the Director of Military Assistance.
- e. Coordinates DOD policy matters and positions in connection with United Nations activities other than those dealing with arms and trade control, and serves as the monitor for DOD aspects of the preparation of international security plans, including United States collective defense arrangements.

In addition to the above operational type functions the Policy Planning Staff involves itself with such endeavors as foreign disaster relief; international aspects of outer space; Arctic and Antarctic Affairs; external research projects which have international security aspects; security review of transcripts of Congressional testimony; focal point for DOD position on future control of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and all actions that do not clearly fall within the area of responsibility of other ISA offices.

²⁰The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) was established in 1966 to assist the Secretary of State in discharging his authority and responsibility for interdepartmental matters. Its membership consists of the Undersecretary of State who is the Executive Chairman, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of USIA and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) formed in 1961 was abolished with the establishment of the SIG.

Although the Policy Planning Council does conduct politico-military studies in support of other ISA directorates and does advise on emerging basic problems in world situations and possible DOD courses of action the major portion of its effort is operational and reactive to present day situations and crises. This Council played a large supporting role to the Ad Hoc Committees established by President Kennedy to deal with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The then Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Mr. Paul Nitze, was a key member of the President's Ad Hoc Committees and as such employed the resources of this office extensively during these few critical days.

Also within the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans and Arms Control is a Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Affairs who is responsible for keeping abreast of economic policies and economic defense policies in all foreign countries including those of the Sino-Soviet sphere. In addition to these functions the Office of Foreign Economic Affairs is concerned with the implementation of the Food-for-Peace programs, including Public Law 480.

Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, "The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954", provides for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to certain foreign countries who pay for the commodities in their own currencies. To implement the agreements negotiated under this Act, an Inter-agency Staff Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal (the ISC) was formed. Ten agencies including Agriculture, State, Commerce, Treasury, the International Cooperation Administration, Bureau

of the Budget, the Office of Emergency Planning, USIA, the Export-Import Bank, and Defense, participate in the work of this Committee. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), in particular the Office of Foreign Economic Affairs, represents the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the three military departments on the ISC.²¹ The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Comptroller is the alternate DOD representative on the ISC.

In addition to general authority provided by P. L. 480, Defense and other ISC participating agencies are given certain administrative authority pursuant to Executive Order 10,708, dated May 6, 1957. Under these directives, the Department of Defense is given specific responsibilities in authorizing and programming foreign currency uses under subsections 104(c) (common Defense grants) and 104(f) (Payment of U. S. obligations) of the Act. Under DOD Directive the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is given Defense responsibility for development and execution of all international security programs relating to plans for the use of foreign currencies generated by sales of surplus agricultural commodities. The Department of Defense has primary responsibility for the use of approximately 20% of the local currencies generated pursuant to Title I, P. L. 480.²² About 5% of this is used

²¹DOD Participation in the Implementation of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as Amended, (P. L. 480) Status Report No. 6 (June 30, 1958), p. 5.

²²Ibid., p. 6.

for military family housing projects overseas. The remainder is and has been used for a variety of items such as: supplemental funds for Inter-American Geodetic Survey mapping in foreign lands; purchasing certain defense items overseas such as Austrian aluminum powder; purchase of military vehicles manufactured in Japan to replace U. S. manufactured ones; and for the purchase of military consumables overseas such as spare parts for indigenous armies. There are to date agreements and negotiating instructions in existence for more than forty-five countries.

Office of African and Western Hemisphere Affairs

The Regional Directorates maintain primary DOD liaison with the Department of State; AID; the Joint Staff; Defense Intelligence Agency; Military Assistance Advisory Groups; Military Departments; and other OSD components such as Administration, Comptroller, Installations and Logistics, Public Affairs, Systems Analysis and Legislative Affairs on all country and regional matters in their assigned areas. The regional directorates also participate in policy development and activities of international organizations as they pertain to their areas. It is the regional directorates which represent the Department of Defense in staff consultations with the Department of State and other governmental agencies on matters of regional interest including but not restricted to issues such as Military Assistance Programs and Military Export Sales policies. Although the regional divisions within ISA are very similar

to those maintained in the Department of State variations do occur from time to time within the ISA organization.

One of the most recent rearrangements (August 1967) within ISA is the bringing together of the Directorate for African Affairs and Western Hemisphere Affairs under one Deputy Secretary. Such rearrangements occur within ISA with great regularity and are prompted by a desire to distribute the responsibilities and work load more evenly among the six Deputy Assistant Secretaries, as well as to better utilize the expertise available. The organizational structure of ISA is in no way considered to be sacrosanct and close coordination among all branches of the organization is maintained and encouraged which, as will be pointed out later, is most important to the overall functioning and effectiveness of ISA. This close coordination similarly contributes in no small measure to the ease of reorganizing the structure when personnel and emphasis changes occur.

The Directorate for Africa directs the development and coordination of all DOD policies pertaining to the countries of Africa and the Malagasy Republic with the exception of the United Arab Republic which falls within the purview of the Directorate for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. The Directorate for Western Hemisphere Affairs has similar responsibilities for the countries of the Western Hemisphere, except Canada, but including the Islands in the Caribbean. Canada because of its participation in the North Atlantic Alliance is a responsibility of the Directorate for the European Region.

Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

The Directorate for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs is organized into three Divisions. There is an office for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus affairs; a Near East office which is further divided under an assistant for Israel, United Arab Republic, Lebanon, and Syria; and an assistant for Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden affairs. A South Asia office comprises the third division and its responsibilities are distributed between an assistant for India, Ceylon, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkam, and the Maldives; and an assistant for Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and CENTO affairs.

Office of European and NATO Affairs

The development and coordination of all DOD policies pertaining to the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, with the exception of Greece and Turkey, and in addition the countries of Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Malta and Berlin are the responsibility of the Directorate for European and NATO affairs. This office in addition to performing functions similar to the other Directorates participates in all policy development and activities of NATO including the nuclear planning groups. The Office is therefore separated into three groups--Country Affairs, NATO Affairs, and Nuclear Planning Affairs, and each is headed by a Deputy Director.

Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs

The Directorate for East Asian and Pacific regions is responsible for the already defined Directorate functions as they pertain to the

countries of the region except the USSR, which as already mentioned is a responsibility of the Policy Planning Council. Specifically these include Korea, Nationalist China, Chinese Peoples Republic, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Phillippines, Japan and Ryukyus, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Pacific Non-Trust Territories and Vietnam. In addition to these country responsibilities all LOD interests in the SEATO and ANZUS alliance matters are focused through this office. It is interesting to note that the Director for this region is a Navy Rear Admiral and that ten of the fourteen professionals in the directorate are military officers. This is by far the largest concentration of military officers within a Regional Directorate.

It may be noted that the majority of the countries in this region are recipients of military assistance and a significant amount of MAP matters are handled daily by this office.

The Office of the Director of Military Assistance

Perhaps one of the most significant branches of ISA today is the Office of the Director of Military Assistance which has replaced the Office of Programming and Control established in 1956, which in turn replaced the then existing Office of Military Aid Programs. The title for this office has thus come full circle, and again represents more nearly its actual function.

The creation of a Director of Military Assistance in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

was a part of the many new administrative procedures incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which largely came into being as a result of recommendations of the Draper Committee.

The Draper Committee was created by President Eisenhower in November 1958 under the full name of "President's Committee to Study the U. S. Military Assistance Program". This Committee was chaired by William H. Draper.²³ The Draper Study was not the first on this subject. During the 1950's there were fifteen major studies, but the Draper Report was the most comprehensive, scholarly, and definitive and it did result in extensive changes in aid legislation.²⁴

The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 replaced the Mutual Security Act of 1954, and completely revised the basic legislation that had governed the conduct of both military and economic assistance. This new legislation, as already pointed out, was the product of a critically comprehensive and independent review and evaluation of current problems of national security, foreign policy actions taken in the past, and the legislation and organizational procedures that had governed the previous application of U. S. assistance. This Act was amended in 1962, 1963 and again in 1966.

In essence, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, was designed to give new vigor, purpose and direction to the foreign aid

²³The other members were: Dillon Anderson, Joseph M. Dodge, Alfred M. Gruenther, Mark Leva, John J. McCloy, George McGhee, Joseph T. McNamara, Arthur W. Radford, and James E. Webb.

²⁴Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 41.

program. Comprehensive programs of assistance to friendly foreign countries were authorized under the new Act which:

provides the authorization for programs of economic assistance to other nations (Part I);

authorizes military assistance to friendly countries and international organizations (Part II); and

contains a variety of general administrative and miscellaneous provisions.

Although changes relative to military assistance were more limited than those in the economic sphere, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 did effect certain changes in the methods of financing and administering military assistance.

Responsibility for the overall coordination of the Military Assistance Program with the foreign policy of the United States is vested in the Department of State. The responsibilities of the Secretary of State for military assistance are set forth in Sec. 622 (c) of the Act which states:

Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of the assistance programs authorized by this Act, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thusly.

It is, thereby, the Secretary of State who makes the determination for the President as to which countries qualify for the assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act and that it is within U. S. foreign policy

and defense interests to grant the aid. The Secretary of State after making these determinations advises the Secretary of Defense who initiates the action to program the delivery of the military assistance.

The Secretary of Defense is charged under the Act with the following military assistance functions:

Determination of military end-item requirements;

Procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration with service programs;

Supervision of end-item use by recipient countries;

Supervision of the training of foreign military personnel;

Movement and delivery of military end-items;

Establishment of priorities in procurement, delivery, and allocation of military equipment; and

Any other functions within the Department of Defense with respect to the furnishing of military assistance.²⁵

The Secretary of Defense has delegated most of these military assistance functions to various elements within the Department of Defense, but general authority to act for the Secretary of Defense in military assistance matters is delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs, subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. In this regard the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is charged with responsibility for

²⁵Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Part II, Sec. 623. Hereinafter the Act will be referred to as the F.A.A.

the development, coordination, and establishment of procedures pertaining to the Military Assistance Program; supervising, administering and directing the Program; and planning, organizing and monitoring the activities of Military Assistance Advisory Groups. The Director of Military Assistance, within the ISA organization, is assigned the responsibilities for the carrying out of these functions.

Although the Director of Military Assistance (DMA) acts for the ASD(ISA) in military assistance matters, and is responsible for all military assistance activities of the Department of Defense, the Regional Directors in ISA are also responsible for providing the DMA with advice and assistance, and, in conjunction with the appropriate Division within the DMA's office, for taking action on matters pertaining to the politico-military aspects of military assistance in their respective geographical areas. The Regional Directors in turn provide the focal point within ISA on area and country military assistance matters with the Joint Staff, Regional Offices of the Department of State and other appropriate agencies. On the other hand, actions which require primary coordination with the individual military departments or the Coordinator's Office in the Agency for International Development are the responsibility of the DMA.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have several specific responsibilities in connection with the administration of military aid programs which include recommending military objectives, force objectives, scale of equipping and priorities, both on a country and an area basis. Accordingly, the JCS is charged with continuous review to assure that

Military Assistance Programs are in consonance with global security plans, and that military assistance resources are being distributed most effectively in promoting U. S. strategic concepts. In instances where the supply situation is such that priorities for allocation of material among the recipient nation, or between the recipient nations and U. S. forces, must be established, the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is sought.

On the basis of recommendations made by the military departments, the Joint Chiefs nominate officers for positions as Chiefs of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups. In this particular sphere of activity, the Joint Chiefs recommend to the Secretary of Defense the manpower and organizational requirements of the various MAAG's and recommend the Service to provide the Chief of each MAAG.

All military assistance guidance, plans and programs are also referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and recommendation. All directives and communications to the Unified Commands,²⁶ the military departments, and to the Military Assistance Advisory Groups which pertain to military assistance affairs and have strategic or military operational implications, are coordinated with the Joint Staff. Likewise JCS directives and communications to the same agencies, which

²⁶A unified command is a joint force of units from two or more of the military services under the command of one officer, and is responsible for specific military operations within a given geographical area. There are seven unified commands throughout the world.

pertain to military assistance affairs, are required to be coordinated with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). The Joint Staff has a Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs to provide the staff support for these activities.

The military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force) in their turn are charged by the Secretary of Defense for preparing the data necessary for the development of programs and budget estimates, and for providing advice and recommendations for changes in programs, in accordance with instructions of the ASD/ISA with respect to cost, availability, source of supply, delivery forecasts and funding requirements. Subsequently, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force procure and deliver to the programmed recipients the material and services included in approved and funded programs.

The Services also provide the MAAG's and the Unified Commands, as appropriate, with such technical military advice relating to weapons systems, tactics and doctrine, and pertinent information as may be required to carry out their assigned responsibilities. Each Military Department, in respect to the area or areas assigned to it, is also responsible for providing administrative support to Unified Commands and MAAG's subject to the direction and policy guidance of the Director of Military Assistance. These functions are all performed in close coordination and cooperation with the Director of Military Assistance in ISA who maintains extensive Operations, Plans and Programs Branches which are charged with reviewing and evaluating the results of prior year programs, current year programs, and future year planning.

As a result of the implementation of the Draper Committee recommendations, many of the responsibilities formerly exercised separately by the military departments were delegated to the Unified Commanders. This change has permitted integration of military assistance activities before the point of State-Defense review is reached. The Unified Commander is required to integrate the MAP with regional U. S. defense planning.

The Unified Commanders command and supervise the activities of the MAAG's in their area of responsibility. These functions include: recommendations to the JCS and Director of Military Assistance on the appropriate size and functions of MAAG's; direction and supervision of submission of military assistance planning and programming data and budget data for administrative support programs; provision of necessary technical assistance and support (in conjunction with the military departments); and, general supervision of the MAAG's in carrying out their various assigned functions.

The Unified Commanders further provide an intermediate level of policy guidance and review between the Department of State and Defense and the MAAG's. As such they recommend to the Secretary of Defense changes in Military assistance program country guidance, program levels and content, and the time-phasing of material deliveries and training programs. Based upon military guidance issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Commanders issue detailed military guidance to the MAAG's for their use in formulating planning and programming recommendations.

In summary, the Unified Commander exercises supervision over all the functions of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups. It is only on technical and administrative matters that the MAAG's may communicate directly with the respective military departments. For all other matters, the line of command to the Department of Defense is through the Unified Commander.

The Chiefs of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups are representatives of the Secretary of Defense in the countries to which they are accredited. However, as representatives of the United States in another nation, they are subject to the authority of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically provides that the Chief of the Mission

shall make sure that recommendations of all such (all U. S.) representatives pertaining to military assistance are coordinated with the political and economic considerations and his comments shall accompany such recommendations if he so desires.²⁷

Acting under the supervision of the Unified Commands, MAAG's have the following responsibilities:

Make recommendations to the Unified Commander concerning military assistance in their respective countries.

Develop military assistance plans and programs, in cooperation with the Ambassador, and submit them to the Unified Commands.

²⁷FAA, op.cit., Sec. 622.

Observe and report on the utilization of material furnished and personnel trained by the military assistance program.

Administer military assistance sales transactions.

Provide advisory services and technical assistance to recipient countries.

Arrange for the receipt and transfer of military assistance material.

In countries where no MAAG establishment exists Service Training Missions may be assigned MAAG functions. In these instances, the Commanders of Unified Commands will call upon the appropriate designated Mission Chief to provide the necessary information and assistance required to conduct a Military Assistance Program within such country. In several countries which receive military assistance on a limited scale, a U. S. Military Attache is charged with the responsibility of the MAP administration.

The precise status of MAAG personnel in host countries varies according to the provisions of the applicable Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements with each country, the host country's interpretation of privileges and immunities accorded under international law and comity, and the applicability of other agreements, such as Status of Forces Agreements.

Full diplomatic status is generally granted to the MAAG Chief and to the senior Army, Navy and Air Force Officers. A second category of personnel, usually the remaining commissioned members of the MAAG, enjoy the same privileges and immunities, except inclusion on the "Diplomatic Lists". A third category of personnel, normally the non-commissioned MAAG personnel, are accorded the same status as the clerical personnel of a Diplomatic Mission. It might be mentioned here that the key personnel who have been selected for MAAG assignments undergo a four week course of instruction at the Military Assistance Institute in Washington, D. C. The course at the Institute includes study in the field of U. S. foreign policy, orientation briefings on the country where the individual is being assigned, background briefings on the MAP and MAAG operations, and certain specialized training for programming officers.

Now let us examine the planning and programming procedures for Military Assistance and the role of the Director of Military Assistance in these procedures.

The annual Military Assistance Program on which the President's budget and appropriation request is based are predicated on what has been decided as to the military requirements to meet long-term U. S. foreign policy and strategic objectives as well as a pragmatic awareness of what the Congress will support in assistance monies. The annual program submitted to Congress represents that portion of a long-range plan and program which must be funded in the fiscal year for which appropriation

is requested in order to ensure delivery of material and services when needed to meet agreed plans for activating, modernizing or maintaining the allied military forces involved. The procedures briefly are:

Policy objectives and order of magnitude dollar guidelines are transmitted to the Unified Commanders by the Director of Military Assistance accompanied by appropriate procedural guidance. The Director of Military Assistance also provides the Unified Commanders with a detailed listing of the articles and services which are available for the MAP. Strategic guidance is transmitted to the Unified Commanders by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Based on this guidance and any supplementary instructions of the Unified Commanders, each Military Assistance Advisory Group, with the assistance of the other members of the Country Team, provides the Unified Commander with information required for development of the country plans and programs. The views of the U. S. Ambassador are provided to the Unified Commanders and to the Department of State.

The Unified Commander's military assistance plan and program recommendations are submitted to the Director of Military Assistance.

The Director of Military Assistance distributes these plan and program recommendations to the Military Departments for review of pricing, lead time, and availabilities; to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review for consistency with U. S. strategic plans; and to the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the Bureau of the Budget for policy review and coordination.

The annual budget year program which takes into account (a) the priorities of the international military political situation, (b) the availabilities and lead time of military material and services, and (c) the resources expected to be available is then developed. The Military Assistance Comptroller in the Office of the Director of Military Assistance, as mentioned earlier, is now a separate agent from the Office of the Defense Department Comptroller. The Budget Division within the Military Assistance Comptroller's office is responsible for the coordination and review of all reports received from the JCS, the individual services and the MAAG's themselves concerning the costs and budget estimates for the implementation of the various military assistance programs that are either in existence or proposed to be established in the individual countries. It is this Budget Division that prepares the proposals for the Secretary of Defense that are in turn sent to the Bureau of the Budget to be incorporated in the President's Budget.

The President establishes the amount of new obligational authority to be included in his Budget, and submits it to the Congress.

After completion of Congressional action, the annual program and the long-range plan and program are adjusted to conform to the actual appropriation and revised as necessary to reflect any changes in the conditions under which it was originally developed and approved. Final approval for implementation of the annual program is then obtained from the Administrator of AID and necessary apportionments from the Bureau of the Budget.

The Director of Military Assistance issues Military Assistance Program orders and other instructions to the Military Departments, together with appropriate fund allocations.

The Military Departments take supply and procurement action, effect deliveries of material to the countries, and provide training and other services. Utilization of material by recipients is supervised by the MAAG's.

As the occasion warrants, the Director of Military Assistance receives recommendations for changes in the approved program from the Unified Commanders, the JCS, and other agencies and adjusts the program to conform with changes in supply availability, the international situation and to U. S. national security objectives.

Forecasts and reports of deliveries and performance are submitted periodically by the Military Departments to the Director of Military Assistance and distributed to the Unified Commanders and MAAG's.

Also within the Military Assistance Comptroller's office is a Finance and Accounting Division whose responsibility is to keep abreast of the actual expenditures of funds and to provide the necessary assistance to the Inspector General, Foreign Assistance who under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is charged with the task for continuous audits and review of the efficiency and economy of programs, determination that the program is in compliance with applicable laws and evaluation of program effectiveness.²⁸

²⁸ FAA, op.cit., Sec. 624 (a).

The Inspector General, Foreign Assistance has his office in the State Department and is advised by the Secretary of State of the latter's decision to grant military assistance at the same time that the Secretary of Defense is similarly advised.

The system for administering military aid may seem somewhat complicated but it has virtues which were not available in earlier programming. The most important improvement over previous systems is that there is a coorelation of responsibility and the program is reviewed by all echelons from the Secretary of State down to the MAAG's. Each echelon has the opportunity to review the feasibility of the programs and make recommendations, and coordination is provided by the Director of Military Assistance in ISA.

Office of International Logistic Negotiations

The U. S. International Logistics Negotiations (ILN) program, better known as Military Assistance Sales, has come to the attention of the public through the press in particular as a result of the 1965 Pakistan-India confrontation over Kashmir, and more recently with the involvement of the Export-Import Bank loans with arms purchases and through the objections of the Congress to the \$400 million revolving fund maintained by the Department of Defense to finance arms sales.

The Military Export Sales program conducted by the 25-man Office of International Logistics Negotiations is headed by Mr. Henry J. Kuss, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA/ILN). This office has been in

existence since June 1962 attempting to associate Industry and Defense in a search for an understanding to the problems involved in broadening military exports and to act as a point of coordination for the solution to these problems.

The specific interest of the Department of Defense in the Military Export Sales Program is stated in the following three objectives:

1. To promote the defensive strength of our allies consistent with our own politico-economic objectives.
2. Promote the concept of cooperative logistics and standardization with our allies.
3. Offset the unfavorable balance of payments resulting from U. S. military deployments abroad.

The magnitude of the first objective is illustrated by the fact that in the ten year period 1952-61 Congress and the Executive Branch approved the expenditure of over \$17 billion in foreign assistance to promote the defensive strength of our Allies. In fiscal year 1961 alone, the military Grant Aid program of the Department of Defense amounted to \$1.45 billion. Military sales accounted for only \$630 million, or less than half those of the grant program. At the end of fiscal year 1966, Grant Aid stood at \$824 million while the military arms sales had skyrocketed to \$1,937 billion, or 235% of the aid program.

While the financial capability of many of our Allies has made it unnecessary for the Congress and the Executive Branch to continue appropriating money for the payment of exports to some of these Allies, the

objective of promoting their defensive strength through exports has remained part of U. S. policy. Export sales is envisioned by the Department of Defense as a plan to substitute finesse for largesse in foreign military logistics. One Air Force Colonel expressed it by saying, "these military ties can join with the economic and cultural interests to form strong bonds that will hold firm underneath the froth frequently stirred up at the diplomatic level".²⁹

Experience in Europe in recent years has indicated to the Department of Defense that the potential for the second objective, standardization, has increased several hundred times with the increased industrial participation of U. S. and foreign companies in design and production of military equipment. Because of this participation, aircraft, missile systems, and support equipment are more common to the United States and European logistics systems than ever before.³⁰

Deputy Assistant Secretary Kuss recently pointed out that:

We've worked harder than probably any other military force on maintenance problems. Yet, like the old equipment we were giving away, the logistics systems and maintenance guidelines were out-dated. In effect we were developing our own support systems one way, selling our allies support in another way--even though in war time five U. S. divisions and seven divisions from another nation would be fighting in the field side by side, reporting to the same commander. International support-ability by itself would be worth a premium price. By optimizing export sales, we tend toward achieving it without having to buy it.³¹

²⁹ Armed Forces Management, Vol. 11 No.,4, (January, 1965), p. 28.

³⁰ Henry J. Kuss, Aerospace, Vol. 2 No. 4 (Winter 1964), p. 14.

³¹ Armed Forces Management, loc.cit.

The overseas expenditures of U. S. forces in the last few years have constituted a drain on U. S. international balance of payments in an amount approximately equal to the deficiency. One of the major actions taken since 1962 to offset this deficiency has been the promotion of military exports consistent with the political and economic objectives to meet the defense objectives of our Allies. Mr. Kuss, in talking to the International Editor of Armed Forces Management magazine in January 1967, explained the value of military sales to our balance of payment deficits in this way:

From the military point of view our ability to deploy forces abroad and pay the foreign exchange costs of these forces is in part made possible by the dollar receipts of our Services from their military sales, for it is the net foreign exchange cost that is considered in our national defense gold budget--and in this net calculation--do you realize that it takes \$160 million of trade to compensate for every 40,000 man U. S. Army division slice in Europe. This means a total of \$960 million in trade to compensate for our Army troops in Europe. Some \$320 million in trade additionally to compensate for our Air Force troops in Europe and some \$160 million in trade to compensate for our Naval forces in Europe--for these are the amounts of dollars that European countries actually receive as a result of the foreign exchange expenditures of our forces abroad. I am sure that you can see the important relationship of trade income and economic ability to deploy³²

Export receipts in 1966 were 41 percent of defense expenditures abroad and brought the net adverse effect of U. S. Department of Defense expenditures down to \$1.7 billion from a high of \$3 billion in 1961.³³

³²Armed Forces Management, Vol. 13 No. 4 (January 1967), p. 46.

³³Kuss, loc.cit.

The goal set by the Office of ILN in 1962 was to maintain a \$1.1 billion cash receipt level through the rest of the sixties.³⁴ This goal has been exceeded, and \$11.1 billion of arms have been sold over the past five years. ILN attributes a good deal of the success of this program to the support of the military departments.

The cooperative logistics support aspect is what has motivated the Army to work hard on the program. Brigadier General Howard Eggleston, Army Deputy Chief of Staff/Logistics Director for International Logistics has stated:

If we are really sincere about having viable allies, we must do this. Our policy is that logistics support is a national responsibility but an ally can buy his way into our system as part of a hardware procurement. And when he does, he gets a good deal for the price he pays.³⁵

The Navy sees the export sales program as a means to exert U. S. military influence on developed countries. The Navy is now selling twice as much as they are giving away and the Navy's projected sales figures are going up. The Navy feels its two big selling points are quality plus support effort. The U. S. has built a reputation for feeling more of a responsibility along support lines, and even though the U. S. price may be higher than the competition, foreign navies are buying from the U. S. because they want the back-up which goes with each purchase.

³⁴Armed Forces Management, Vol. 11 No. 4 (January 1965), p. 28.

³⁵Ibid.

Philosophically, the Air Force sees the values developing out of an export sales program in compatible overseas ground environments; equipment standardization essential to successful combined operation in emergencies; joint acceptance of strategic tactical concept and doctrines built around common hardware; truly complimentary forces in different nations; and common, interchangeable logistics.

Still the Air Force considers their proper role in export sales as one supplementing rather than leading the activities of industry. Air Force Colonel Stan Johnson, former Chief of Air Force Military Sales Branch has stated:

Our biggest contribution to the program can be made in drawing together with our allies a closer relationship in tactics, operations, support and equipment maintenance, making sure they have all the facts available about U. S. hardware and production capabilities before making a buying decision.

It is not implied from the above that the Services have been lethargic over the program. On the contrary, individuals in each military department have, according to the people in ILN, set some impressive records. While they support ILN's effort to a greater extent than they initiate their own sales endeavors, the services' expertise and resources make them invaluable. Nevertheless, military sales exports represent a break with traditional service oriented conservatism which has in the past not been associated with commercial overtures.

Another aspect of the program which is a key tenet to its success is to bring industry more actively into the program. In contrast to

what might be expected ILN has found the economy and the nation are just not geared to military exports. A great deal of effort has and is being expended to convince the heads of many U. S. companies that the export market is worth investigating.

Military sales are not and never have been very much like commercial sales overseas. According to Mr. Kuss, military sales are deeply imbedded in military-political thinking. In military sales it is necessary to think like an ally, for instance on the tactical use of tanks, or the firepower vs. armament trade offs. One of the primary sales resources then becomes the military man in the field of contact with military allies.

The members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) provide this contact; one of ILN's most important tasks is to help bring the military men of the two countries together.

Another important aspect of the program is the effort for improved management. Some of the relatively simple roadblocks, i.e. getting a military export license, obtaining the necessary clearances to send people overseas have been streamlined. But getting the word to the MAAG man in the field on what is expected of him is a communications exercise that is still being perfected. The military man in the field must be flexible. Imagination, initiative, and intelligence are more important than any specific guidance from ILN because no two sales are alike.

The sale of military equipment to foreign customers differs from selling commercial products in many ways which influence the structure

of the sales team and its methods. First, in general terms, the customer is always a government of another country or specifically its armed forces or internal security arm. Second, the sale of arms and their purchase are strictly controlled by all governments of the world. Third, the market environment is of critical importance. The political climate, the economic situation of the customer country and the stability of its armed forces demand more attention from defense salesmen than the sale of commercial goods normally would from commercial salesmen.

How the System of Military Sales Works

Within the United States Government, the Department of Defense is the key agency responsible for foreign military sales. The fountainhead is found in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) or specifically as already mentioned, in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations (DSA/ILN). The DSA/ILN and his staff do not and cannot operate a \$1.5 billion a year sales program solely on a Defense Department basis. In line with constitutional principles and bureaucratic precepts, the sales program is supported and checked by other government agencies. Congress, of course sanctions and furthers the sales program through its Foreign Aid, Export Control, Trade Expansion and Banking legislation, appropriates funds to maintain the program and up to the present time has authorized a management fund to help finance sales. It is

this last authorization that has come under attack in the fiscal year 1968 foreign aid authorization bill. This authorization in all probability will be withdrawn by June 30, 1968. If indeed this is the case, it will greatly effect ILN's ability to negotiate arms sales to countries who in the past have relied heavily on credit sales for their arms purchases. This management, or "revolving fund" as it is referred to in the Pentagon, was authorized by the Congress in 1963 and provided for a \$400 million fund which has been used for short term loans to purchasing countries. When the loans are repaid the funds are used again for other loan purchases. There have been no defaults to date. The alternatives to this type of revolving fund are: (1) a cutback in the sales programs; or (2) increased Military Aid Appropriations on the part of Congress to finance these loans. The first of these alternatives will not help our balance of payments, and the second will be an extremely difficult undertaking with a Congress not too favorably inclined toward Aid bills. The total fiscal 1968 MAP appropriation when finally approved by the Congress will be in the vicinity of \$560 million, or less than one half of the fiscal 1965 appropriation.

Although, in their Defense Appropriation and Foreign Assistance hearings, members of Congress probe into the foreign military sales program, they do not generally interfere with its daily conduct. The Department and agencies which do have almost daily contact with ILN are State, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA).

The State Department's principal responsibility in the foreign military sales field is the control of exports and imports of munitions and associated equipment and technologies. State approves arms sales in the private field through munitions control, and in the public field through the military assistance and military sales. Mr. Kuss meets with his counterparts in the State Department once a week to iron out the U. S. foreign policy position on any given sale.

The Agency for International Development (AID), which receives policy guidance from the Secretary of State, may also have an interest in military sales if police forces are to be equipped or if the financing of a sale involves an AID barter agreement.

The U. S. Information Agency (USIA) may also be involved to evaluate a sensitive public information problem or to explain to its foreign audience why the U. S. is engaged in a particular sale.

The Commerce Department which has primary cognizance over non-military U. S. international trade also supports ILN by providing foreign industrial information, basic marketing data and publicizing NATC business to U. S. industry.

The key agency responsible for the formulation and execution of policies and programs dealing with international finances and currencies is the Treasury Department. Credit arrangements with governments which wish to buy military systems offered by ILN are worked out frequently between ILN, Treasury and the Export-Import Bank of Washington, a government banking institution. Like the revolving fund, these

Export-Import loans have come under fire from certain quarters of Congress, notably the Banking and Currency Committee who this year protested that they were not consulted on this type of arrangement.

Sometimes the barter of agricultural commodities is part of the financial arrangement to pay for the purchase of weapons and the Department of Agriculture and its Commodity Credit Corporation get involved.


The AEC, NASA, and FAA become involved in foreign defense sales if systems or technologies under their respective jurisdiction are to be exported. The AEC by law regulates and controls the dissemination and export of nuclear energy technology, products and materials. The National Aeronautical and Space Administration is interested in military sales if the national space program, its hardware and technology become involved. The Federal Aviation Agency concerns itself with aviation and air traffic control plans as these systems may be involved.

It is interesting to note that the functional responsibilities assigned by the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA to IIN state that the development of policies, plans, and programs for foreign military sales in countries for which substantial military assistance (grant aid) is planned are to made in coordination with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary/ISA, and those for countries where no military assistance is planned are coordinated with the Regional Directors of ISA. This distinction serves to provide a close coordination of sales activities with MAP programs through the front office of ISA.

The management structure of the micro-staff (25 people) for sales has changed little in the past five years, but like the rest of ISA it has undergone some changes in responsibility assignments, and the original (1962) division into color (Red, White, Blue, Gray) Teams has been replaced in the past year with divisions into Directorate assignments. A basic feature of ILN Directorate responsibility is his dual mission: a regional assignment, and a functional assignment for the entire ILN staff.³⁶ Since the bulk of the actual as well as the potential defense market lies in Europe, three of the Directorates concentrate on the continent and its countries (United Kingdom, European, and Federal Republic of Germany). The absence of Africa from the regional breakdown reflects the Department of Defense's thinking--that there is no market in sight there for years to come. ILN, out of necessity, has concentrated on sales of large weapons systems in the past. But now interest is growing to reach second and third tier producers and suppliers in the United States and interest them in this market. ILN, as a government unit, concentrates on government-to-government sales. Once in a while it deals with foreign industry when a four-way coproduction project is negotiated.³⁷ The Main Battle Tank Program, the

³⁶ See Figure 3, page 62.

³⁷ The word "coproduction" entered the Department of Defense lexicon in 1963. Coproduction is a concept whereby a U. S. designed item of equipment is produced in a foreign nation from parts manufactured both in the United States and in the foreign country. This concept was adopted to assist the balance of payment posture of the purchaser.



- - - - - coordination

FIGURE 2

ILN REGIONAL & FUNCTIONAL LINES

MBT-70, signed by the ministers of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany and the U. S. Secretary of Defense in August 1963, is a prime example of this type of negotiation. The MBT-70 will be producible and supportable logistically in both countries. ILN representatives meet periodically with their German counterparts to determine along with the U. S. and F. R. G. Project managers discussion matters that should be addressed at the ministerial level. If the project is successful, and from all indications it will be, other NATO Allies may well wish to purchase the tank. There have already been indications of interest from Belgium, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.

The opportunities for dialogue and cooperation in such arrangements cover a wide spectrum and are evident in a recent problem of standards for fasteners which became a major problem early in the design stage. After negotiation, it was agreed that the U. S. Produced parts would use the inch standard, Germany would use the metric, and where there was interface, or joining of parts, the metric standard would be used. This is the first adaption of international thread fasteners standards.³⁸

To back up ILN in the conduct of sales negotiations the resources of the entire Defense Department can be utilized. Within ISA the Director of ILN receives regional information from the country desks (Regional Directors), and cooperative programs with foreign nations are worked out

³⁸Armed Forces Management, Vol. 13 No. 4 (January 1967), p. 53.

with other Defense offices, such as the Director of Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E) on Cooperative R&D and Data Exchange Agreements, and with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) on Cooperative Logistics Support (spares, maintenance).

In the field, ILN has the authority to use the resources of the Unified Commands, the Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and the Defense Attache system where no MAAG group is present in the area. As previously pointed out, the MAAG's are the principal contacts between ILN and foreign armed forces. Since the MAAG's are in a key position to know the needs of foreign armed forces and are familiar with high foreign defense officials, their contribution to the foreign military sales effort is immense.³⁹ There are other Defense field activities, such as NATO liaison offices, material missions, the Defense Advisor of the U. S. Regional Organization in Europe (USRO), which also are available to support the sales program.

Mr. Kuss and his ILN staff readily recognize that techniques for achieving sales are constantly evolving and becoming more sophisticated. The direct, out-right sale is becoming tougher while the quid pro quo is becoming more important. The coproduction agreement is a prime example of this kind of technique.

Like so much of ISA, ILN is also interested in cutting red tape, and to do this the effort has been made to keep the organization small, and as already pointed out, leave implementation of the programs to the

³⁹Ibid., p. 51.

Services while ILN plays the role of coordinator. As expressed by Mr. Kuss, "Cutting red tape and an entrepreneur-al attitude are really the clues to our coordinating job".⁴⁰

Because ILN relies on the military departments, the Joint Staff, Treasury and other agencies to carry the workload, they are able to direct greater in-depth attention and monitoring to programs. Because of their functional assignment tie-ins the regional groups are closely knit so that when one group has a general problem it is almost invariably a problem which concerns all groups.

As the newest and probably the most dynamic organization within ISA today, the Office of International Logistics Negotiations is playing a large supporting role in both the formulation and execution of national security policy.

Special Offices

The most recent rearrangement (August 1967) of responsibilities within ISA resulted in the creation of three special functional offices which report directly to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary.⁴¹ None of these offices are new to ISA, but until this past year they were assigned as additional responsibilities to a Regional Director. These separations from a geographical environment is more in keeping with their world-wide interests and also reflects a desire within ISA to unencumber

⁴⁰Armed Forces Management, Vol. 11 No. 4 (January 1965), p. 29.

⁴¹See Figure 2, p. 28.

the duties of the Regional Directors so as to allow them to be more responsive to their primary assignment.

The first of these special offices is the Directorate for Foreign Military Rights. The primary responsibility of this office is to work in conjunction with other interested offices of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Department of State, and other governmental agencies in developing instruction for U. S. representatives in negotiating for military facilities and operating rights abroad. This Office also has cognizance over Status of Forces Agreements which are maintained with all countries in which U. S. military forces are stationed such as Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Germany.⁴² This Office is primarily composed of personnel with extensive backgrounds in international law.

The second of these special Offices is that of Military Assistance Review whose prime function is to develop coordinated integrated policy guidance for both the Military Assistance Programs and Military Assistance Sales system. Guidance for the preparation of long range Military Assistance and Military Export Sales plans and programs so that they are in consonance with U. S. military strategy and broad objectives is also the concern of this office. In essence this is the office that backstops the Inspector General, Foreign Assistance located

⁴²In 1955 the United States had over 500 military bases and installations in foreign countries--today there are fewer than 200.

in the Department of State in providing a continuing appraisal of the MAP process. It is also this Office that prepares the draft Memorandum for the President on Military Assistance that is used in preparation of the Budget Request to the Congress.

The last and newest (August 1967) of the special offices is the Directorate for Foreign Disclosure and Trade Control (FDTC). This new office is responsible for Defense participation in trade information control programs including all international programs designed to limit or alter the free flow of trade. Participation in export control programs including all United States programs designed to limit or direct the flow of exports of articles of information from the United States is also a responsibility of this Office. The foreign disclosure aspects of the Office's responsibility concerns the coordination of Defense positions and policy recommendations on all matters pertaining to the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and international organizations. It is also the responsibility of this office to maintain contact with representatives of foreign governments, and foreign and U. S. industry in connection with foreign disclosure and munitions export control cases.

As can be concluded from a review of the detailed functions of the various offices within ISA, there are few, if any, international problems or concerns that do not involve the Department of Defense, and ISA is the focal point for most of these involvements.

CHAPTER IV

ISA IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICY PROCESS

With the growth of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and particularly the office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, a focal point has been created for Department of Defense positions on national security matters. This growth in size and power of the international security affairs area of the Defense establishment has resulted from awareness of the fact that defense policies are not a matter of military strategy alone, but as stated earlier they involve the availability of resources---men, money and materials---and relationships with allies and international organizations. They, therefore, require the coordination of many different government agencies.⁴³

The International Security Affairs Office in the Pentagon has in effect been placed between the two main sources for military and political advice--Defense and State. As already pointed out, in addition to responsibilities for military aid to foreign nations, ISA regional directors maintain direct liaison with the country desks of the State Department.

⁴³U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Organizing for National Security: Studies and Background Materials (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Volume 2, pp. 202-03.

National Policy Community

A closer look at the specific day to day working relationships of ISA both from within and without the Defense Department reveals the magnitude of the role that this Office has come to play in national policy formulation, but before doing this it might be well to make a few observations about the national policy making community itself.

The policy making community probably cannot be described as a large firm. This is perhaps due to its not having calculable control over its desired end product, which is, hopefully, order in a world of conflict. Furthermore, it tends to be people and issue oriented, and not much concerned with procedures or definite goals. Professor Brodie has described policy making as ". . . .a multi-storied structure, and the higher we get in it the more we tend to be removed from the area of careful, dispassionate analysis."⁴⁴

It appears that the policy making community is composed basically of the Secretaries of State and Defense, and their principal Deputies, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially the Chairman. In addition, key subordinates of the Cabinet level include the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, the Assistant Secretaries of State for regions, the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA, and the deputies and

⁴⁴Bernard Brodie, Strategy In The Missile Age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 388.

staffs of these men. It is these key subordinates who constitute the policy making community for day to day business.

This policy making community is distinct from two other "communities" in national security affairs which are also concerned with the future and preparation for it. One of these could be labeled the "force development and deployment community". Most of the Defense Department is concerned with this endeavor. A projection of future conflicts, however crude, is needed to establish force requirements. The projection, however, depends more on plausibility than probability, and this is as it must be. However, from a purely military point of view, force requirements planning must be based on enemy capabilities, not intentions, for intentions can change more rapidly than capabilities. The process of determining force requirements from scenarios does not depend very much on timely and very detailed input from the real world, as the large part of the world scene and its types of conflict change only very slowly. The types of simulation employed in this type of projected scenario are labeled "war games" which are designed to test the feasibility and capabilities of forces.

A third community in national security affairs could be called "command and control". Its primary preparations are in communications hardware and organization and ultimately it is responsible for operations. The National Military Command Center (NMCC), located in the Pentagon, is the prime focus of this community, and its Command Post exercises are large-scale simulations of conceivable situations. The NMCC functions primarily as a message center and information repository.

The three communities interact only very crudely in the normal course of events, and as a result each tries to keep its requirements rather flexible to accommodate the others. But altogether they have different functions, different personnel, and different perspectives on the world.

They definitely interact in time of crisis, as now in Vietnam, or in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. But the interaction takes place at the level of the President, and the immediate Presidential group, such as the Executive Committee of the Cuban crisis on which the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA was a key member. Here policy, forces, and direction are joined for action.

Returning to the policy making community itself, it tends to be exclusive, almost a clique. It is interagency in composition, and agency institutional views tend to be blurred by the search for consensus. The community tends to co-opt members on a "good man" basis.⁴⁵ The "good men" in turn reach out for their own "good men", and thus the community consists of expanding circles. It is probably correct to state that most members are quite modest about their influence, and tend to think of themselves as ultimately staff men for the President or for their Secretary.

⁴⁵ Other popular terms used within ISA to connote this same premise are "busy brights" and "busy dulls". They refer to those whose opinions are valued and sought, "brights"; and to those whose opinions are not sought on other than purely routine matters, "dulls".

As for the substance of the policy making community's work, the majority of its members are concerned in the first place with the long-range future, the shape of the world and its yield of broad policy (as for instance toward nuclear proliferation). The resultant policies set perspectives, attitudes, and interests. But very little time or effort appears to be spent by the upper level members of the community in this area. There is an evolution, a growth, of broad policies that finds expression in public speeches, in American politics, in the commentary of journalists, but it is at best a fuzzy process. Policies actually articulated are usually ex-post facto, and have little to do with the actual choices of strategies and programs.

Following broad policy comes strategy. Here the emphasis is on manipulation of factors not as much for a desired outcome as for the capability of remaining engaged in world affairs. This is demonstrated by an emphasis on deterrent strength and the signalling of that emphasis. Strategy is closely related to force development, deployment and control, but the policy makers have to be very careful not to outrun or assume too great a subtlety of application of the existing capabilities.

The next step is programs of action in implementation of policies and strategies. The policy making community is here involved chiefly in the stopping and starting of such programs, while others administer them.

Between the longer range policies and operation in actual crises comes contingency planning. This is sometimes referred to as "crisis anticipation", and there is an attempt to combine available forces,

authority and communications with the scenarios prior to policy decisions. In this type of planning the community manipulates scenarios, as in a politico-military game.

Finally, the policy making community supports decisions in actual crises through quick preparation of alternative courses of action and estimates of action-reaction sequences. This time-urgent planning is the kind done by the "good men".

This look at the policy making community points up one very significant reality and that is that the world is complex, its problems multifarious and pressing. As a consequence the policy making community feels an almost continual sense of crisis (life is just one thing after another). Little time is left for detailed long-range planning or methodical applications. It is thus difficult to compel the attention of the most influential of policy makers on other than the pressing problems of the moment. This fact was clearly evident during the Cuban missile crisis. Up until the time that agreement was given by the Soviets to withdraw the missiles and medium range bombers from Cuba, the top policy makers were in almost continuous session. Following these agreements it was impossible to gather the group together for lesser decisions such as inspections. The crisis had passed and the problems of Cuba were no longer pressing.

It is also difficult to discover the "world outlook" of the important policy makers. It can probably be said that they have an essentially

pragmatic view of the world, and would probably lean to a chaotic interpretation of it. They are also inclined to look for quick solutions to current problems.⁴⁶

Functioning of ISA

With this as a background let us now return to the Office of ISA itself. ISA is basically a non-institutionalized organization which enjoys and readily uses its prerogatives to cut across traditional and service lines in search of answers and solutions to current problems. It has been, as a result, both responsive and quick in furnishing the Secretary of Defense with the necessary information and analysis to support him in his capacity as a statutory member of the National Security Council. These prerogatives on occasion have been criticized by some as having the effect of by-passing older and more traditionally structured organizations such as the individual military services as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This, the critics point out, is not to say that a "military opinion" is absent from the decisions or positions arrived at by ISA. Such opinions are invariably supplied by the project officers (both military and civilian) assigned to ISA who have authority to deal directly with an individual service action officer, Joint Staff officer, or even a Unified or Specified Command in order to

⁴⁶These thoughts concerning the policy maker and the community in which he operates are based on numerous discussions with ISA, JCS, and State Department Planning staff members and former members, and the personal observations of the writer over the past two years from within the Pentagon.

obtain the information required for the position being formulated. However, the ingredient that some critics fear is overlooked in this approach is the acquiring of a Joint Staff "military position" which may or may not be the same as a "military opinion" on any given issue. Although it may surprise the traditionally bound, this procedure it can be argued, is not much different from the informal relationships that are employed in the practical functioning of most organizations. Of course one can point to many dangers in such a procedure, such as the risk of overlooking some important aspect of the problem by relying on one or possibly two "opinions" instead of a well considered "position" or consensus of many. The expertise and personality of the individual introducing the "opinion" and not the position he may occupy, has become the creditable point in this argument. In ISA today this is the reality. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA, Mr. Paul C. Warnke, and his deputies are men who enjoy reputations as men of valued expertise. These men and their assistants are today exercising a great deal of influence in national security policy formulation.

This procedure of utilizing men for what they can do rather than because of the titles they may bear is not a new approach in Defense organization. James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, it is said, liked to insist that he was not as much interested in the diagram of organization as he was in the names in the little boxes. This view is a common and important one. Organizations are made up of men; there is no substitute for their quality. Formal organization was, in the

mind of Mr. Forrestal, not all important, but in large scale organizations, he realized, it is an unavoidable starting point of inquiry.⁴⁷ This same theme prevails in the minds of other government leaders such as the Secretary of State who recently said, "No organizational chart can substitute for the abilities and attitudes of people."⁴⁸

To develop this thesis of a few enjoying considerable influence a step further, it is necessary to mention the veto influence that the planners and desk officers in ISA are in a position to exercise over positions submitted by the Joint Staff concerning military matters.

To do this, let us consider a hypothetical but nevertheless typical problem situation. A situation is developing in country X which can affect U. S. interests on a wide range of issues--economic, military, as well as political. The related cables sent by the on scene Ambassador are distributed simultaneously to the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ISA. The regional desk officer in ISA gets in touch immediately with the corresponding desk officer in State either in person or by telephone. The method of contact depends on the classification or sensitivity of the matter to be discussed. After this contact and an initial exchange of information, the ISA officer commences to develop "Defense's" position based on the best available

⁴⁷Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 179.

⁴⁸Message from Secretary Rusk to his colleagues in the Department of State and Abroad, March 4, 1966.

information. This information may be contained in existing contingency plans, or as mentioned above, obtained by direct liaison with the individual service action officers, or by direct contact with various members of the Joint Staff. If some of the information sought is only available from a Unified Commander in the field (e.g. CINCPAC, CINCLANT) direct inquiry is made. If necessary, the ISA officer may likewise contact any other agency or department in the government for information.

In the meantime, the Joint Staff has also received the same cable. But the Joint Staff Officer taking action on the matter does not enjoy the benefit of direct and informal relationships with agencies and departments other than the Unified Commands. He is restricted by the functional and structured lines of communication that are inherent in the military chain of command. As hard as he may try, it is not possible under the existing procedural restrictions to prepare a Joint Staff position that is a consensus of all three services in the time frame that the task is being accomplished by the ISA officer operating under a completely flexible modus operandi. Not only does the internal discipline and traditional institutions of each service hinder the Joint Staff officer, but the difficulties in obtaining an agreed position among the services is also a source of delay, and in some instances produces less than a creditable result. As a consequence, the position that finally is forwarded by the Joint Staff to the Secretary of Defense (it goes via ISA on all politico-military matters) may be late in arriving, or may have little validity when it does arrive because of the concessions which may

have been made to obtain a consensus. As a further consequence, the position rendered by the Joint Staff may not be in agreement with the position arrived at by the ISA officer. It is now vulnerable to being changed or overruled. Here again, expertise and personality enter the arena of decision. Should the ISA officer wish to challenge the Joint Staff position he can make his disagreements known to his immediate superior who in the majority of situations is one of ISA's seven Deputy Assistant Secretaries. He may, also, to support his disagreement, go back to the individual service action officers (Army, Navy or Air Force) who worked on the JCS position to get their separate thoughts on the issue itself and to determine those items which may have been eliminated or modified in order to produce an agreed service position. Should he discover that there was a split vote on the position in the first place, or that in obtaining the consensus a significant compromise was made, his argument for challenge is further substantiated. All this, of course, tends to weaken the Joint Staff position and strengthen the arguments of the ISA officer when he presents his challenge to his superior. It is not uncommon in these instances for the Joint Staff position to be overruled in favor of that of the ISA action officer. The present members of the JCS have recognized the degree to which consensus seeking can inhibit the military input to national security matters and have recently advised their action officers that although there is a strong desire for agreement, particularly at the action officer level, there is a preference to present dissenting opinions

rather than compromising a paper into an inferior proposal. Dissenting opinions, although preferred, still give the ISA action officer the same opportunity to push for his "position" vis-a-vis a Joint Staff position in which there is disagreement.

Although it is possible for Joint Staff positions to be overruled by ISA, it must be pointed out that the issues on which this occurs are not usually of a substance that would classify them as primary issues. Such primary issues are dealt with by the individual statutory members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves and their decisions on such issues are sent directly to the Secretary of Defense and are, thus, not directly subject to a veto by ISA. However, ISA may still be asked by the Secretary of Defense to review and comment on these JCS positions.

This point notwithstanding, the fact still remains that those issues which are subject to being overruled by ISA, although not primary in nature are issues which can, and oftentimes do, become a part of overall national security policy.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Office of International Security Affairs has thus evolved from a simple military assistance institution to a politico-military bureau. This has come about because of a transformation of power that has been in process since World War II from a simple politico-military form of JCS--President (and advisers) to the more complex forms of a new elite of State-White House-Defense. But, the growth of ISA has occurred primarily because the role of the Defense Establishment in the area of international security affairs has grown with the realization that defense policies involve not merely matters of strategy, but also involve relations with allies and international organizations, and are influenced by the availability of resources. The close coordination with other agencies of government which these require is the basic concern of ISA whose charter also designates the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the functional field of international security. In this capacity the Assistant Secretary is authorized to coordinate not only with the Department of State, but with the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Department of Defense agencies having collateral or related functions in this field, and to make full use of the established facilities within the Defense Establishment. This authority is central to the effective functioning of ISA.

In tracing the origins and the varied and complex involvements of ISA in national security policy formulation, this inquiry has endeavored to point out the flexible and changing structure of the organization itself.

It probably can be said that reorganization is good from time to time for it realigns formal relationships and trims off ancillary informal off-shoots that tend to sap the viable operative apparatus of an organization. We must assume, of course, that most organizations have, and need, informal relationships. But even these require control and occasional review to permit orderliness to obtain. There is also reward in reorganizing formal organization to eliminate such things as "layering", "inverse pyramid", and "middle management squeeze-out". Each of these conditions are found in organizations where active top management is responsive to strong personality leadership or vast diverse workloads much of which is dollar-oriented or political effective.

This, it would seem, is what ISA has been doing since its establishment, but the process is not, nor will it ever be, complete. The self analysis will most likely continue in order to determine:

1. Is ISA required?
2. If so, is it fulfilling its mission? and,
3. If not, how can it do the job better?

Historically, the answer to the first question is probably "yes". ISA developed because a need for coordination between the Departments of State and Defense existed to deal with the new and complicated

politico-military involvements of the post World War II period. There does not appear to be any lessening of this requirement in the foreseeable future.

The second question, is it doing its mission, is more difficult to answer because ISA appears to be carrying out three tasks at the same time, while manifestations of a new, not clearly definable mission, seems to be on the horizon. The three tasks that can be identified are: (1) accounting for, disbursing, and manipulating MAP accounts including military assistance sales; (2) justifying or denying JCS military (and sometimes non-military) thoughts, hopes and reactions; and (3) bolstering and balancing plans or operations of other organizations and agencies--AID, State, Commerce, NASA, etc. Jobs (2) and (3) lend themselves to creating demands for new tasks, namely research, and planning of foreign policy wherein military considerations are a lesser function of the whole.

ISA is intended to function as "the bridge" between the Departments of Defense and State, but in so doing there is the possibility of ISA becoming a third force and the relationship becoming one of competitor rather than broker. There is today within both Departments some feeling that this is the case. In order to thwart this trend, there are recent instances of informal relationships and direct coordination between the action officers of the Joint Staff and the Country Desk Officers of State which by-pass "the bridge" and provide, what is considered by those who use the by-pass, a more significant military input into State and vice versa.

This leads to the third and perhaps more difficult question, how can it do the job better? No doubt there are things that it can do better for certainly the frequent reorganizations and redistributions of functions that seem to go on continuously within ISA (there have been three substantial realignments within the organization in the past two years) would indicate an effort to do this. There also seems to be some basis to the criticism that ISA has too many bosses and too few "indians". This malady is an inevitable consequence of a small organization of highly educated and talented people each seeking his place in the sun. There has been over the years a steady increase in the numbers in the top management of ISA without a corresponding improvement in the numbers of the staff who are doing the detail work, and who should spend much more time than they now have available on research and analysis.

ISA is, like much of the policy making community, a crisis management environment and there is a constant requirement for "now" answers. This may indicate a lack of defined objectives and a tendency to be only reactive rather than capable of progressive and positive initiatives. This is a criticism that could be directed at all the policy making community, and is one which is easier recognized than remedied.

In spite of internal problems which exist in ISA, and certainly problems exist in any organization, especially if it is dynamic, ISA is nonetheless a considerable and positive influence in the national security affairs area.

Timothy W. Stanley, in his book American Defense and National Security, writes:

Formulation of national security policies can be likened to a triangle with the President at the apex, the Secretary of State at one angle, and the Secretary of Defense at the other. The National Security Council might well occupy the center.

The two Secretaries, however, are themselves the peaks of their own vast organizational pyramids. Each and each alone is charged with the primary responsibility for his area. It is the office and person of the Secretary rather than the Department itself which is assigned responsibilities and must give advice to the President. Although he cannot dodge the ultimate responsibility, the Secretary much delegate some of it. In the area of International Security Affairs it is the powers and duties of the Secretary of Defense which have been delegated to an Assistant Secretary of Defense and his Staff. In his own right the Assistant Secretary for ISA, of the twelve Assistant Secretaries in the Defense establishment, is the only one who is a designated member of the corporate body known as the Joint Secretaries--comprising the two top civilian officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of each military department.⁴⁹ He also attends the twice weekly policy meetings with the State Department, and enjoys close working relationships with numerous other agencies, including Arms Control and Disarmament and the Director of the National Security Council. Just as the State Department

⁴⁹U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Organizing for National Security: Studies and Background Materials (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 202.

represents the United States as a whole in international matters, so ISA officially represents the Pentagon in dealing with other agencies-- and with other countries.⁵⁰

Dr. Stanley aptly sums up the role of ISA when he writes, "Of all the units under the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is the most directly related to the overall organization for national security".⁵¹

The assigned responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA which direct him to maintain close coordination with other agencies reflect in large measure the findings of the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery that a close partnership must obtain at all levels between the Departments of State and Defense particularly at the echelons where the critical initial work of planning takes place.⁵² As a result, a great deal of influence has been focused in the Assistant Secretary of Defense which is readily transmitted through the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council. With current, reliable and meaningful information to assist him in formulating his recommendations to the President, the Secretary of Defense can and does make a considerable contribution to the formulation of national security policy in the country today.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 203.

⁵¹ Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 45.

⁵² U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Organizing for National Security: Staff Reports and Recommendations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Volume 3, p. 50.

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C. INTERVIEWS

Captain Arthur Berndtson, USN, former member, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Captain Jon Boyes, USN, former Assistant for Korea, Japan, Ryukyus, Northeast Asia Affairs, Office ISA.

Mr. Lansing R. Felker, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary, ILN/ISA.

Mr. Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., Project Officer, Plans Division, Office ISA.

Commander Donald V. Gorman, USN, former Assistant, Office of Directorate for Arms Control, ISA.

Colonel Fred Haynes, USMC, former Special Assistant to Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary/ISA.

Mr. James K. Pont, Military Economic Assistant Coordinator, Policy Planning Branch, ISA.

Colonel Jack A. Rogers, USA, former Executive Officer, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs.

Lieutenant Colonel B. A. Ramundo, USA, former Assistant Director, Foreign Military Rights Affairs, Office ISA.

Captain Robert Page, USN, Executive Officer, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs.

Captain Paul Schratz, USN, former Project Officer (Navy), Plans Division, Office ISA.

Mr. Timothy W. Stanley, former Chief and Project Director, Current Projects and MLF Affairs, Office ISA.

Mrs. Betsy White, Editorial Assistant, Office of Director of Military Assistance, ISA.

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